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I. Introduction
In 1970, Hungary and Ireland were both relatively poor and had about the same standard of living, as measured by their per capita GDPs of about $2,000 U. S. We do not think it is in any way an exaggeration to refer to this continuing transformation of Irish Society as a miracle, or to apply this term to the very similar transformations that are occurring in Taiwan, and Singapore. Never before have the lives of so many people undergone so rapid an improvement over so long a period, nor is there any sign that this progress is near its end (Lucas, 1993) . How did this miracle happen in Ireland? It did so to a large part by attracting technology through FDI to increase its knowledge base.
FDI plays an important role in the economic development policies of several countries including Ireland, Israel and Taiwan. Since the late 1960s, Ireland has focused mainly on FDI based industrial development policies. Israel has focused on inducing industrial R&D activities through government grants, with project ideas originating solely from private industry. Taiwan relied on public research agencies to lead R&D efforts and diffuse the results throughout industry (Breznitz, 2007) . FDI inflows can bring in the latest technology, create employment and lead to tradable goods. FDI not only enables the transfer of intangibles to another country but also makes knowledge spillovers possible and therefore may play a role in indigenous entrepreneurship.
These knowledge spillovers can lead to the establishment of new home-grown enterprises in the host country leading to further economic development (Young, Hood and Peters, 1994) . 3 Software was the main sector where indigenous companies and not only Irish subsidiaries of MNCs achieved worldwide success. The number of indigenous software companies in Ireland rose form 129 in 1991 to 630 in 1998, while the total number of firms rose from 365 to 760 (Breznitz, 2007, p. 12) .
In this paper we build on internalization theory and use data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), to explore if and how the policy of attracting inward (FDI) from multinational enterprises impacts indigenous entrepreneurial activity. We use GEM data to profile and compare entrepreneurial activity in Ireland and Hungary (Reynolds, et al 2005) . We expect that countries will benefit from FDI spillovers when there is a strong cultural context that supports entrepreneurial activity.
Such a context will lead to more individuals perceiving entrepreneurial activity as a desirable economic choice. More specifically, a strong supporting cultural context will lead to a higher percentage of the population having a strong personal entrepreneurial context. A strong personal entrepreneurial context is one where the individual perceives opportunities, believes that they have the skills, knowledge and experience to start a business, and has a personal entrepreneurial role model. The effect of a strong supporting culture and positive personal context will be higher levels of opportunity-based entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, we expect populationlevel differences between Ireland and Hungary in terms of (i) levels of opportunitybased entrepreneurial activity, (ii) the entrepreneurial culture of the population; and (iii) the personal entrepreneurial context of the population (Sternberg and Wennekers, 2005) .
Based on internationalization theory we expect that entrepreneurs in Ireland and Hungary will differ in terms of 'type' of person exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities and the nature of the opportunities they pursue. First, we expect that for entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities that arise from knowledge spillovers, entrepreneurs will need the appropriate personal absorptive capacity or the appropriate 'knowledge' and resources. While these cannot be measured directly, we expect that higher levels of education might indicate that entrepreneurs are using higher levels of 'knowledge' in their entrepreneurial activity. We also expect that entrepreneurial activity in Ireland will be more pervasive in sectors where entrepreneurs are exploiting opportunities relating to MNE economic activity.
Therefore, we expect differences between Irish and Hungarian entrepreneurs in terms of the (i) education levels and (ii) new venture sectors.
Section two presents the theory of FDI and its role in Industrial Development 
II.I. Internationalization Theory
Internalization theory describes how local firms' knowledge of laws and relationships with local players provide 'home court advantages'. Foreign firms must leverage special advantages, often information-based intangibles, in order to compete in these markets (Morck and Yeung, 1991; 1992) . Foreign firms must choose from a number of international trade options such as exporting, licensing, strategic alliances, or joint ventures. MNEs find it difficult to leverage capabilities through arm's length transactions such as exporting due to the need for on-the-ground service or the presence of high trade barriers. Options such as licensing, strategic alliances, or joint venturing may not be optimal due to MNEs' concerns about piracy of intellectual property, reverse engineering of goods and also differing production qualities of branded goods. When faced with such problems, firms choosing to internationalize by retaining direct control of their intangibles become MNEs.
In today's global knowledge economy, firms are more interested in countries in which they can take advantage of strategic assets, especially intangibles such as information and human capital. Thus, more recent FDI flows have shifted from the stand-alone variety described above to more strategic-asset seeking activities that involve the MNE combining resources in order to achieve its goals. In the case of the copper mine, this new FDI takes the form of a developmental relationship with the host country, perhaps establishing a production facility or, at the extreme, even R&D capabilities. This type of FDI is long-term and face-to-face and requires knowledge transfer across the MNE. The MNE's ability to access countries' resources depends on the relational capital (e.g. goodwill and trust between firm and its actors such as customers, partners, governments, suppliers). Once a MNE finds a country that offers a long-term strategic asset, there are advantages to maintaining a presence in the country. FDI also enables institution-building legal and business frameworks and physical infrastructure, increases local human capital, and reduces the stigma of doing business in a developing country.
II.II. Knowledge Spillovers and Entrepreneurship
During the course of FDI activities, there is a transfer of technology and intangibles to the host country that involves people and machinery, and some of this knowledge spills over. These spillovers are not intentional as the MNE is a profit-maximizing entity and is not willing to transfer knowledge unless it obtains a return. Knowledge First, not all types of FDI have the same potential for knowledge spillovers.
The potential for knowledge spillovers is related to the type of FDI and the level of human capital in the host country. FDI in high technology industries is more likely to generate knowledge-intensive spillovers (Buckley, Newbould and Thurwell, 1988) .
High levels of human capital (formal education, on-the-job training including industry, management and business development experience) make it easier for entrepreneurs to start high value-added firms. Individuals working in MNEs obtain higher levels of training and development than in local firms (UNCTAD, 1994) and wish to obtain the best returns for these skills. Individuals may feel unable to realize appropriate returns in the existing firm or may believe that the bureaucratic MNE does not value this knowledge, and seize the opportunity to create a new entity.
Second, for such entrepreneurial activity to occur, the host country will require a cultural context that supports indigenous entrepreneurial activity. Such a context will lead to more individuals perceiving entrepreneurial activity as a desirable economic choice. For entrepreneurs to exploit opportunities that arise from knowledge spillovers, entrepreneurs need the appropriate personal 'knowledge' and resources.
While these cannot be measured directly, we expect that higher levels of human capital might indicate that entrepreneurs are using higher levels of 'knowledge' in their entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, as different types of FDI enable different levels of knowledge spillovers, we expect that entrepreneurial activity will be more pervasive in sectors where entrepreneurs are exploiting opportunities relating to MNE economic activity (Acs and Varga, 2005 (Ruane and Görg, 1996) . However the oil shocks of the 1970s and the ensuring global recession forced many foreign firms to close their operations in Ireland. In particular, labor-intensive firms involved in sectors such as man-made fibers, textiles, clothing and footwear, found that Ireland was no longer an attractive location.
In response, the IDA developed new policies that targeted 'flagship' emerging high technology sectors such as electronics, computer software, biotechnology, and healthcare. Often, the IDA targeted relatively young firms in these new key sectors.
For example, Apple Computers located in Ireland prior to becoming a public company in the US. The Irish government subsequently extended incentives to cover firms engaged in internationally traded services (e.g. financial services, call centers).
Reflecting the nature of such activities, and the policy objective of generating employment, firms receives employment grants as well as capital grants (that is, payments per job created). In addition, a broad range of policy tools such as training grants, subsidized rents, technology transfer grants and low interest loans were used by the IDA to tailor packages that would be attractive to specific firm needs (Murphy and Ruane, 2004) . The Irish government also sought to increase the flow of trained graduates to industry by creating new National Institutes of Higher Education (tertiary colleges with a focus on vocational skills).
From the 1990s, the number of firms investing in Ireland significantly increased. In particular, there has been tremendous growth in the scale of FDI inflows from the US. Of the one thousand foreign firms located in Ireland, 46% are headquartered in the US. These American firms account for 75% of all exports from foreign owned Irish subsidiaries and 69% of employment in foreign-owned Irish subsidiaries 7 . This rapid growth may be partly explained by 'demonstration effects'.
In explaining the decision to invest in Ireland, executives of newly arriving firms in sectors such as computers, instrument engineering, pharmaceuticals and chemicals cite that their location decision is strongly influenced by the fact that other key market players were located in Ireland (Naveretti and Venables, 2004) .
There has been a significant change in the sector representation of firms locating in Ireland since the 1970s, when foreign firms primarily operated in low technology sectors. For example, by the late 1990s, over half of Ireland's foreign industry was in high technology sectors, with about a quarter each in medium and low technology sectors (Naveretti and Venables, 2004) . Following government policy initiatives, a growing proportion of FDI was directed to ICT sectors (Carlsson, 2005) and key FDI dominated sectors in Ireland now include office and data processing, medical and optical equipment, radio, TV and communications, chemicals, electrical machinery and apparatus, paper and printing, food, and pharmaceuticals. 
III.II Emerging Entrepreneurial Policy in Ireland
In addition Industrial policy has focused assistance on established and new manufacturing firms, which had export potential, or to substitute for an imported product. 
III.III Entrepreneurial Activity in Ireland
The period of rapid growth in the 1990s was characterized by an increase in the number of new businesses. Not surprisingly, this entrepreneurial activity was concentrated in sectors related to the increase in domestic demand. The rapid increase in the numbers at work in Ireland translated into an increase in consumer spending, in real terms, of about 75% between 1993 and 2003. Using registrations for Value Added Tax (VAT), a requirement if a business or sole trader will sell more than €25,000 (service businesses) or €50,000 (manufacturing businesses), the areas of activity where entrepreneurial activity was most prevalent in 2000 were in the construction sector, one third of net new VAT registrations, and other professionals, a group comprising advertising, architects, barristers, solicitors, legal agents, press, were one fifth of net new VAT registration.
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The nature and scope of entrepreneurial activity in Ireland suggests that entrepreneurship is now positive career choice for many well educated Irish workers.
Did the policy of attracting FDI directly or indirectly influence such entrepreneurial activity? While knowledge spillovers from MNEs can be difficult to demonstrate, Grög and Strobl (2002) Services Centre, which is home to over 450 firms, the majority of which are foreign owned. Process flow industries, many of which include subsidiaries of MNEs, count for a larger share of production in Ireland than they do in many other EU countries.
Furthermore, a significant number of indigenous firms reported that selling to foreignowned firms in Ireland had helped directly to provide access to export markets (O'Malley and O'Gorman, 2001 ).
In addition, it appears that specific policies adopted by the development agencies were important in facilitating entrepreneurial activity in the software sector.
In the survey by O'Malley and O'Gorman (2001), 80% of the respondents reported receiving some form of state financial assistance, and of those, just over half said that this had been important or very important to their company's development. The main impact of such aid is to enable firms to hire employees earlier and to build sales faster, to enable them to take risks which they might have had to avoid such as following speculative market leads, and to boost profitability which enables other finance to be sourced more readily (Clarke, 1995) . A majority (three-fifths) of firms also reported that they received non-financial assistance such as marketing information and assistance with developing management skills and business planning from state development agencies, though for most firms (80%) such non-financial assistance was not of great importance
or not relevant at all. We now turn to a discussion of the role of FDI and indigenous entrepreneurship in the Hungarian economy.
IV. Hungary Case Study
When were privatized, and foreign investors played a major role.
IV.I Inward FDI in Hungary
The Hungarian government's policy of attracting FDI was based on the expectation that foreign firms would bring much-needed financial capital as well as innovation and market economy-related management practices. Initial FDI was directed to privatization of state-owned Hungarian enterprises, especially in the manufacturing sector (ITD, 2004) . The Hungarian government was particularly keen to attract blue chip companies and sometimes offered these firms monopoly or otherwise strong market positions (Sass, 2003) . The earliest foreign investors included individuals with some experience with Hungary, as émigrés from Hungary or those previously involved with Hungarian firms. Initial FDI inflows were directed to low-cost and low-valued-added production and the opportunities enabled by national and EU government grants and subsidies. In addition to privatization, early FDI was market seeking, focusing on the food and beverage sectors and characterized by "first mover" advantages, e.g. Coca-Cola. FDI was directed mainly to Budapest and to the Central and West Transdanubian region (ITD, 2004) . Many of these early foreign investors took minority ownership, but increased these to majority stakes ovr the years (Inzelt, 2000) . Meanwhile, this first phase of FDI was characterized by little cooperation between foreign and Hungarian-owned enterprises (Inzelt, 2000) .
In 1990, there were just 231 wholly foreign owned and 4,462 partly foreign owned firms operating in the Hungarian economy; by 2004, these numbers rose to 17,000 and 10,000 respectively (ITD, 2004) . With the influx of new firms, the scope of FDI has also changed. The Hungarian government introduced a number of performance requirements in order to secure benefits from the FDI. These included stricter performance, employment and sales target guidelines as well as requirements to invest in particular regions, sectors and activities (Sass, 2003) . The government also introduced a number of sub-contracting programmes designed to increase
Hungarian suppliers' share of MNE production, however these were met with limited success (Sass, 2003) .
A number of other developments also improved Hungary's FDI fortunes.
Duty-free zones were structured to attract export-oriented Greenfield investment, particularly in R&D. Greenfield investments comprise about 25-30% of FDI inflows and generally lead to the creation of more new jobs, high export-orientation and more advanced production technologies than Brownfield investments (Sass, 2003 to integrate the country into the world economy and to improve labor productivity, competitiveness, innovation, export potential and industry structure (Sass, 2003) .
IV.II. Emerging Entrepreneurial Activity in Hungary
In contrast to the linkages between FDI and indigenous firms, there is little evidence in Hungary that FDI has stimulated indigenous entrepreneurial activity. Connections between Hungarian and foreign businesses are limited, and few external or spillover effects have been reported. This phenomenon is known as the "dual structure" of the Hungarian economy. The considerable variation in the two groups' profitability, competitiveness and export-orientation has persisted over time (Novak, 2002) . First, we review the limited interaction between foreign MNEs and Hungarian SMEs and then turn to a discussion of the extant indigenous entrepreneurship.
The establishment of subcontracting connections between large foreign businesses and smaller Hungarian businesses has had limited success. One example is Suzuki which has the capacity to produce over 80,000 cars a year in Hungary (IDH, 2000) . Hungarian firms are estimated to comprise about 40% of Suzuki's supplies (Sass, 2003) . Still other foreign firms such as Audi, Sony and Opel cars source less than 10% of their supplies from Hungarian firms (Sass, 2003) . In Hungary, it is believed that the type of FDI impacts the scale and scope of backward linkages.
When compared to Greenfield's, FDI inflows to privatization are more likely to retain original indigenous suppliers (Sass, 1997) . For example, the privatized GE-Tungsam unit sources between 60-70 from local firms (Sass, 2003) . Furthermore, certain sectors such as automotive and electronics, are less likely to source from indigenous suppliers (Sass, 2003) . Despite sporadic government efforts, Hungarian SMEs have not been able to meet the quality, financial, timing, and managerial requirements of the MNEs. Although the FDI-driven introduction of new technologies has the potential to spillover to indigenous Hungarian firms, the impact on indigenous firms' performance has been limited (Novak, 2003) . Rather, indigenous firms' performance has benefited from increased competition with MNEs and backward linkages to these firms (Novak, 2003) . A recent loss of some multinationals mainly to East Asia can be contributed to the weak local supplier connections that can be one of the key element of attracting other MNCs in a particular region (Békés, 2005) Hungary has witnessed several phases of entrepreneurial activity. The earliest phase (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) One interesting area for Hungary's future is the young biotechnology sector, comprising more than fifty businesses. This sector is unconnected to the MNEs operating in the Hungarian economy.
V. Nascent Entrepreneurship Comparison
From the case studies, it should be apparent that the major hypotheses concerning national variation in entrepreneurship should be that Ireland and Hungary have followed different economic development trajectories. We might therefore expect that Ireland and Hungary would also differ in terms of the populations' culture and personal attitudes towards entrepreneurs. Furthermore, we might anticipate that the level of opportunity entrepreneurship and the profile of entrepreneurs and their new venture sectors would also differ between the two countries. We put forward the following five hypotheses: 
V.I. Data & Variable Definitions
To test these hypotheses, we use data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
Opportunity Entrepreneurship
An important division is between opportunity and necessity-based entrepreneurial activity. Opportunity entrepreneurship is characterized by voluntary participation in entrepreneurial activities, while necessity entrepreneurship is distinguished by the individual's perception that entrepreneurship is the best option for employment, however not necessarily the preferred option. Opportunity entrepreneurship is calculated as a dichotomous variable where the responses 'take advantage of business opportunity' and 'have a job but seek better opportunities' are coded 1=yes and 'no better choices for work' is coded 0=no. Opportunity entrepreneurship resulted in a smaller sample of 590 total opportunity entrepreneurs: 341 Irish entrepreneurs and 159 Hungarian entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurial Activity Types
Finally, information was gathered about the entrepreneurs' venture activities. 
V.II. Levels of Entrepreneurial Activity in Ireland and Hungary
There are fewer entrepreneurs in Hungary than in Ireland (Table 3 ). The total entrepreneurial activity rate in Hungary for the period studied was 5.45%, compared to 8.07% in Ireland. This difference is statistically significant. Entrepreneurial activity in Ireland is generally motivated by opportunity (rather than necessity) 6.64% compared to 2.75% in Hungary. Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 1.
V.III Entrepreneurial Culture and Personal Context: Adult Population
Next we turn to the population levels of entrepreneurial culture and personal context.
We find significant differences in entrepreneurial culture and the personal context of the adult population between Ireland and Hungary ( 
V.IV. Profile of Entrepreneurs

Demographic Variables
We probed for any difference in terms of age, gender and education demographics (Table 5) . We find no significant difference in terms of gender and age; however, we found a difference in highest level of education obtained. Irish entrepreneurs are more likely to have obtained a higher level of educational qualifications than their Hungarian counterparts. This is statistically significant for both the entire population of entrepreneurs and that of just opportunity entrepreneurs. 1 Thus, our findings support Hypothesis 4.
The New Ventures
As shown in where more than 50% of the product/service is export.
VI. Policy Conclusions
We started this paper with a question, "Could the Irish Miracle be repeated in Hungary?" To answer this question we needed first to understand the Irish Miracle and second, to put the Hungarian economy into global perspective. Let us review the key milestones in Ireland's economic development policy. At the economy wide level
Ireland like Taiwan and Israel pursued:
• A liberated market economy.
• Improved the physical infrastructure
• Improved its education system, leading to higher rates of skill formation between the 1960s and the 1980s.
• Created public telecommunication companies that vastly improved their line subscription rates. Deregulation and privatization of the telecommunication market followed, leading to higher rates of wireless and Internet penetration.
• At the micro and industry level The Irish Development Agency pursued policies of inward FDI for four decades and these policies have evolved seeking to exploit higher value added FDI.
• The Irish Development Agency also pursued an Enterprise Development
Policy to create new firms. The Irish case study suggests that entrepreneurial activity became increasingly important about a decade ago with the development of policies to grow a high-technology sector.
• The policies directed at attracting inward FDI and policies focused on Putting the Hungarian economy into a European and global perspective we cannot miss the fact that Hungary is not in the same position that Ireland was twenty years ago. Hungary joined the European Union at a time when there is much more competition for funds from other former Eastern European countries whereas Ireland joined when it was able to benefit massively from agricultural and regional subsidies. Garvin (2004) the culprits for delaying modern Ireland's industrial take-off until the 1960s are: the anti-economic mind-set of the state's key political and social elites, rooted as they were in the social conditions of the inter-war years; and the Irish Catholic Church for fostering such a mind-set, in particular through its hold on the educational system, which was oriented towards the professions rather than science and practical learning and which for decades denied schooling to most young people beyond the age of 14. The unemployment and emigration crisis of the mid-1950s gave the latter the opportunity to seize hold of the ship of state and open the country to foreign capital and the EU.
3 Ireland also leads European Union countries in the rate of new company formation (The European Observatory for SMEs, 1996) . 4 Ireland experienced unprecedented growth of output, exports, incomes and employment during the decade of the 1990s. The effect of recent growth was that by the year 2000 Ireland had a GNP per capita that was at the same level as the average for the fifteen members of the European Union. Compared to Ireland's economic performance prior to the 1990s and to the economic performance of other under-developed European economies such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, this was a remarkable achievement. This dramatic economic performance has generally been referred to as the 'Celtic Tiger '. 6 This was replaced with a 10% tax on all corporate profits from manufacturing in 1980. 
